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ON THE RELATION BETWEEN SITUATION 
CALCULUS AND EVENT CALCULUS 
KRISTOF VAN BELLEGHEM,  MARC DENECKER,  AND 
DANNY DE SCHREYE 
t> In this paper we make a detailed comparison of the Situation Calculus and 
the Event Calculus, two logic-based temporal reasoning formalisms. We 
concentrate on differences between the calculi, considering the similarities 
sufficiently indicated in the recent literature. We illustrate the inability of 
Event Calculus to handle counterfactual reasoning problems, and that of 
Situation Calculus to deal with counterfactual statements in the presence 
of actions with nondeterministic effects. We present a new calculus which 
extends both Situation and Event Calculus. In this new calculus we define 
a natural and clear relation between situations and time points, which 
differs from those used in previous comparisons. We show the relation of 
this new calculus to both original calculi. We compare the original calculi 
using the new calculus as an analysis tool. © Elsevier Science Inc., 1997 <1 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The Situation Calculus ([17]) and the Event Calculus ([16]) are two well-known 
formalisms for representing temporal domains. The original versions of the two 
formalisms were created with different goals in mind and have a rather different 
ontology. 
Central to Event Calculus is the notion of action occurrences, or events,  at 
certain points in time. These events determine time intervals during which certain 
fluents hold. In the original Event Calculus these time intervals are explicitly 
represented, though in later simplified versions they are only implicitly available. 
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In Situation Calculus the basic notions are actions and situations. A situation 
corresponds to a snapshot of the world at an instant of time. This has been 
interpreted in a number of different ways, e.g., in [20] situations are considered to 
be (hypothetical) periods of time between two actions. In [14] situations are 
assumed to correspond to time points rather than time periods. In [2] a situation is 
seen as simply the set of fluents that holds at a certain instant in time. In this paper 
we adopt the view of situations as time periods. The set of fluents that holds at an 
instant in time will be called the state of the world at that instant. Actions are the 
cause of situation transitions: a result function is used to map (action, situation) 
pairs to the new situation resulting from the execution of that action in that 
situation. 
Although the original versions of the two formalisms did not look very much 
alike, later versions tend to show more and more similarities. A comparison of the 
two formalisms has been a topic of interest in recent years. 
In [20] Situation Calculus has been compared with the original Event Calculus. 
Several problems of the original Event Calculus--caused in particular by the 
notion of time intervals and by the use of predicate completion on all pred- 
i ca tes -were  pointed out, and Situation Calculus was extended with an Event 
Calculus-like time line running through a set of actual situations, adding a 
previously absent notion of real time to Situation Calculus. 
In [14] Situation Calculus is compared with a more recent, simplified version of 
Event Calculus which does not suffer from the aforementioned problems of the 
original Calculus. The similarities of the Situation Calculus and the Event Calculus 
are highlighted by showing that their frame axioms are equivalent under a number 
of conditions. 
In this paper we make a more detailed analysis of the relation between Situation 
Calculus and Event Calculus. We address a number of important issues that were 
left unanswered in [14]. In particular, we study the assumptions made in that paper 
to obtain the equivalence result. We argue that though Situation Calculus and 
Event Calculus are indeed very similar, that is not the end of the story. Some of the 
differences between the calculi are only of a syntactic nature, but others require 
careful consideration as they have some important implications for knowledge 
representation a d reasoning. 
For example, in [14] some extra restrictions are imposed on Situation Calculus. 
This makes certain forms of reasoning--in particular counterfactual reasoning 
about action occurrences-- in the restricted version impossible that are possible in 
the original Situation Calculus. As a result, where a translation of descriptions in 
the language 5a¢ ([11]) into Situation Calculus has been proved sound and complete 
in [7], such a translation into the restricted form of Situation Calculus of [14] is no 
longer possible. This problem is related to the fact that a translation of ~¢ 
descriptions into Event Calculus is also impossible. 
We therefore propose a general formalism which extends both Situation Calcu- 
lus and Event Calculus. We establish a clear relation between time points and 
situations--different from the one in [14]--and prove that assuming this relation, 
both original calculi can be seen as instances of the more general calculus. This 
shows that the new calculus has all the expressive power of Situation Calculus as 
well as of Event Calculus. We use this new calculus as a tool for analysing the 
possibilities and restrictions of both original calculi. 
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Studying the problem of counterfactual reasoning in more detail, we observe 
that not only Event Calculus, but Situation Calculus as well falls short in some 
cases, in particular when actions with nondeterministic effects are present. This is 
due to restrictions inherent in the data structure used in Situation Calculus. We 
show how the new calculus can handle these cases of counterfactual reasoning that 
neither of the original calculi can handle. 
For ease of comparison we consider Open Logic Programming ([6]) formalisa- 
tions of the two calculi. For Event Calculus, the Logic Programming formalisation 
is the historical one. Situation Calculus is more often expressed in classical ogic, 
but can also be written as an (open) logic program under a suitable completion 
semantics. Methods similar to predicate completion have also been used in 
classical ogic formulations of Situation Calculus, for example in [21]. 
Note that the theories we consider are language-independent: under Console 
completion semantics ([4]) an open logic program is equivalent to a first order logic 
theory. In fact, the proofs in this paper are all performed in classical ogic, based 
on the Console completion of the presented open logic programs. 
In Section 2, we briefly describe Open Logic Programming, Situation Calculus 
and Event Calculus. Section 3 motivates a detailed comparison of the calculi by 
pointing out an important point of difference and showing where previous equiva- 
lence results fall short. In Section 4 we present the new general calculus and 
illustrate its use with an application. Section 5 formally relates the new calculus to 
the original ones. In Section 6 then, we point out a problem with nondeterministic 
actions in Situation Calculus and show how the new calculus handles them. We 
conclude the paper in Section 7 with a number of additional issues and some final 
remarks. 
A short version of this paper appeared as [30]. In this extended version we 
include a detailed proof of the main theorem (theorem 5.1), and discuss most 
issues in more detail. We also add an in-depth discussion of the issue of counter- 
factual reasoning in the presence of nondeterministic a tions. Finally we provide 
more comparisons with other work. 
2. PRELIMINARIES 
2.1. Open Logic Programming 
Open Logic Programming ([6]) is an extension of Logic Programming where Clark 
completion ([3]) is applied to a chosen set of predicates instead of to all predicates, 
and where general FOL formulae can be added to the completed efinitions. Open 
Logic Programming is syntactically equivalent o Abductive Logic Programming, 
and it is essentially a slightly different interpretation of this formalism. 
An open logic program T= (P°,C) consists of 
1. P: A set of Horn clauses augmented with negation in the body, i.e. formulae 
of the form A ~ B 1 &. . .  B, & ~ B n + 1 &. . .  ~ Bn +m where A and all B i are  
atoms. 
2. O: A set of undefined (abducible, open) predicates. 
3. C: A set of general first order logic formulae. 
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The set of clauses with a certain predicate p in the head is the definition of p. 
An undefined predicate is a predicate without a definition: its meaning is not 
determined by the program. FOL formulae can be used to express possibly 
available partial information on undefined predicates. 
The Console completion semantics ([4]) of an open logic program is given by the 
FOL theory obtained as follows 
1. For each defined predicate p (for each predicate p not in O), first transform 
each clause of the form p(t 1 ... t m) ~ Body with variables )I1 "'" Yk into 
p( X1 "" Xm) ~ 3Y1 "'" Yk :(X1 = tl & "" t~ZXm = tin&B), 
where X 1 -.- X m are fresh variables. Assuming the resulting clauses for p are 
p(X  1 "" X m) ~-- qb I "" p (X  1 "'" S m) ~-- qbn, then, add to the FOL theory the 
formula 
p(X  1 " 'X , , )  ~ (tha V .-. v 6n). 
Any free variables are assumed to be universally quantified at the beginning 
of the formula. 
2. Add Clark's Free Equality axioms ([3]) to the theory. 
3. To this theory, add all formulae in C. 
In the sequel, also in FOL formulae we assume free variables to be universally 
quantified at the beginning of the formula. 
As indicated in the introduction, proofs in this paper will be based on the FOL 
theory obtained by completing the open logic program. 
2.2. The Situation Calculus 
In this section we present an Open Logic Programming formalisation of the 
Situation Calculus. The basic concepts of the Situation Calculus are situations and 
actions. A situation is defined as a period of time during which there are no actions, 
no changes in fluent values (the world remains in the same state throughout a
situation). Actions are the cause of state transitions: if an action A occurs in a 
situation S, a new situation result( A, S) begins immediately after the action. 
holds(P,S) means that fluent P is true in situation S. initiates(A, S, P) 
(terminates(A, S, P)) denotes that if action A occurs in situation S, this initiates 
(terminates) the fluent P, i.e. immediately after A the fluent is true (false). 
The frame axiom of the Situation Calculus can then be written down in the 
following definition of holds: 
holds( P, s o) ~- initially(P). 
holds( P, result( A,  S) ) ~ initiates( A ,  S, P).  
holds( P, result( A,  S) ) ~ holds( P, S), ~ terminates( A,  S, P ) . 
The completed efinition reads as follows under Console completion semantics: 
a fluent P holds in s o if it is initially true, and it holds in a later situation 
result(A, S) either if the action A leading to that situation initiated P, or if P 
already held in the previous ituation S and was not terminated by the most recent 
action. Otherwise, the fluent does not hold. 
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A Situation Calculus description in general consists of the above clauses plus a 
number of domain dependent clauses defining initially, initiates and terminates. 
These definitions are also completed. If it is not completely known, the initially 
predicate may be left undefined instead. Any number of FOL formulae can be 
added to the theory. 
In for example [22] and [20] a second order induction axiom on situations is 
added to the Situation Calculus. The axiom represents that the situations that can 
be reached from the initial situation by executing a finite sequence of actions are 
the only situations that exist. Under a stronger semantics for open logic programs 
than Console completion, for example under justification semantics ([5]), a similar 
axiom 1 is implied by the following clauses defining situations: 
situation( so ) . 
situation( result( A,  S ) ) ~ situation(S), action(A). 
assuming a domain dependent type predicate action/1 for actions. 
As Console completion semantics is more commonly used and provides an 
immediate mapping to FOL, which facilitates theorem proving, we do not use 
justification semantics in this paper. We instead complete the above definition for 
situations and represent he induction axiom explicitly by the following second 
order logic formula: 
Vqb:[(VS: (situation(S) ~ d#(S))) 
(+(so)&VA,S: 
[( ¢b (S)  &action( A ) &situation(S)) ~ dp ( result( A, S) ) ] )]. 
Formulations of the Situation Calculus in classical ogic often use one predicate 
abnormal instead of initiates and terminates, not distinguishing positive changes in 
truth value from negative ones ([2], [17]). Since this distinction is explicit in Event 
Calculus, we make it explicit in Situation Calculus as well to facilitate comparison. 
Moreover, as indicated in [14], such distinction results in a more detailed and 
therefore more "meaningful" theory. 
Note that many other versions of the Situation Calculus have been used in the 
literature ([17], [10], [1], [25], [2], [20]). We have chosen a simple Logic Program- 
ming formulation which is very close to the one used in [14]. 
2.3. The Euent Calculus 
The world view adopted in Event Calculus differs in some respects from that of the 
Situation Calculus. In Event Calculus one considers one real line of time points. 
Fluents can hold or not hold at a certain time point. We use a type predicate 
time~1 for time points: time(T) means T is a time point. The formula holds(P, T) 
represents that P holds at time T. An event is the occurrence of an action at a 
certain point in time. The occurrence of an event E at time T is denoted by 
1The exact formalization differs from the one in [20] due to our use of type predicates instead of a 
sorted logic, but the semantics is the same. 
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happens(E, T). The predicate happens~2 can be seen as a type predicate for events. 
An event can initiate or terminate fluents, depending on the action associated with 
the event, initiates(E,P) (terminates(E, P)) means that event E initiates 
(terminates) the fluent P. The atom act(E, A) denotes that E consists of an 
occurrence of action A. 
The frame axiom in Event Calculus looks as follows: 
holds( P ,T )  ~ happens( E , ,T1) ,T  1 < T,initiates( Ex,P ), 
clipped( T1, P, T ) . 
clipped(T l, P, T) ~ happens(E2, T2), T~ < T 2 , T2 < T, 
terminates( E2 , P ) . 
The meaning of an Event Calculus program is given by the Console completion of 
a logic program which consists of the above clauses plus a set of program clauses 
defining initiates, terminates, happens, act and <.  initiates and terminates usually 
have domain dependent definitions in terms of act. happens, act and < are usually 
defined by enumeration, asserting a specific scenario in the problem domain. 
Alternatively, instead of giving a definition for happens, act and <,  these basic 
concepts may be left undefined if the scenario is not given. In all cases, any FOL 
axioms can be added to the theory. 
At the beginning of time, say at t 0, there is a start event initiating all fluents that 
are initially true. This is represented by including the following clauses in the 
definition of the predicates time, happens and initiates: 
time(to). 
happens( start, t o ) . 
initiates(start, P) ~ initially(P). 
If happens is undefined (e.g., not completely known), the happens fact above is 
replaced by a FOL axiom happens(start, to). time(t o) is handled in a similar way if 
time is undefined. The new predicate initially which occurs in the definition of 
initiates can either be defined by a set of facts, or left undefined. No events are 
allowed to occur before to: 
happens( E, T) =, ( ( t o < T) v ( E = start)). 
Note that the initial event can actually be omitted, creating a time line which is 
unbounded in past and future. In most applications however, an initial "state of the 
world" is a very useful concept. 
In Event Calculus, the order on time points must be a linear order, so the 
following axioms need to be satisfied for all T~, T2, and 7"3: 
-7 ((T~ < T2)&(T  2 < T1) ) 
((T, < T2) &(T  2 < 7"3) ~ (T, < T3) 
(time(T1)&time(T2)) ~ [ (T 1 < T2) v (T  2 < T,) v (T, = T2) ] 
( T1 < T2) ~ ( time( T1) &time( T2) ). 
The last axiom indicates that < can only relate time points. 
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It has been indicated before, for example in [18] and [8], that not restricting time 
to a linear order leads to certain problems in Event Calculus. Partial orders can 
give rise to undesired models by allowing events to be unrelated in time. This is 
especially a problem if actions have context-dependent ffects. 
A small example, taken from [8], illustrates this: assume we have a light which 
can be on or off (indicated by the truth or falsity of the fluent on). The light can be 
turned on or off by a switch event. This is modeled by 
initiates( E, on) ~ act( E, switch), happens( E, T),  -1 holds(on, T).  
terminates( E, on) ~- act( E, switch), happens( E, T ), holds( on, T ). 
Then assume the light is initially off (we have an empty definition for initially), and 
there are two nonsimultaneous switch events. 
happens(el, t 1 ). act( el, switch). 
happens(e2, t e ). act( e2, switch). 
We do not know which switch event occurs first. In any case, we expect he light to 
be off at any time T later than both events: 
VT:  [(t 1 < T )&( t  2 < T)] ~ ~holds (on ,T )  
should be entailed. Indeed, we expect he first event (whichever it is) to initiate on 
and the second event to terminate it again. However, without the linear order 
constraint, it is possible that neither t 1 < t 2 nor t 2 < t I holds. In that case, both 
events initiate on as it is still false at tl as well as at t z. This leads to the erroneous 
conclusion that at a time point T after t l and t z, holds(on, T) is true. 
Note that the restriction to linear order does not imply that the order must be 
completely known: in each model every pair of different time points must be 
ordered in one way or the other, but in which way is not necessarily fixed. 
Another requirement we impose--mainly for reasons of simplicity--is that no 
more than one event can occur at one point in time. Also, each event can of course 
only happen once: 
( happens ( E, T) & happens ( E *, T * ) ) ~ ( ( E = E * ) ~ ( T = T * ) ). 
Like in Situation Calculus, we introduce a domain dependent predicate action/l ,  
and we impose the constraint 
act(E, A)  ~ action(A). 
We also assume there is at most one action associated with each event: 
(act(E,  A1) &act(E,  A2) ) ~A l =A 2 . 
This axiom can be omitted to allow for simultaneous actions under certain 
circumstances, but for our comparison with Situation Calculus we can exclude 
these altogether. Note also that we assume actions to be instantaneous, here as 
well as in Situation Calculus. Actions with a non-zero duration are not considered 
in this paper. 
This version of the Event Calculus is of course not the only one used in the 
literature. The Event Calculus has changed considerably since its original presenta- 
tion in [16], and a number of simplifications led to several formulations ([9], [26], 
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[18], [15], [8]) which are all slightly different. The above axioms are closest o those 
in [14]. Looking at the variants of Event Calculus described in [24], it is worth 
observing that our variant is not closest o the Simplified Event Calculus described 
there, but rather nearly equivalent to the New Event Calculus as described in that 
paper. This is due to our formulation of Event Calculus as an open logic program 
with FOL axioms instead of a classical ogic program. As a result, our variant has 
all the advantages of New Event Calculus described in [24]. 
2.4. An  Example Problem Domain  
For our examples in this paper, we will use the simple and well-known problem 
domain of the Yale Shooting Problem. The important fluents in this domain are 
loaded, indicating that a gun is loaded, and alive, indicating that a turkey is alive. 
Basic actions are load (with the effect that the gun becomes loaded), wait (which 
has no effect), and shoot (which unloads the gun and kills the turkey if the gun was 
loaded). The action predicate is then defined as 
action(A) ~ [ (A = load) v ( A = wait) V ( A = shoot)]. 
In Situation Calculus, the effects of these actions are represented by 
initiates( A,  S, loaded) <--- A = load. 
terminates( A,  S, loaded) ~ A = shoot. 
terminates( A,  S, alive) <-- A = shoot, holds(loaded, S ) . 
An Event Calculus representation f the domain knowledge is 
initiates( E, loaded) *-- act( E, load). 
terminates( E, loaded) <-- act( E, shoot). 
terminates( E, alive) ~ act( E, shoot),happens( E ,T ) ,ho lds(  loaded, T) .  
We will use examples in this problem domain throughout the paper to illustrate 
and clarify our results. 
3. COUNTERFACTUAL REASONING IN SITUATION CALCULUS 
AND EVENT CALCULUS 
As indicated before, in [14] slightly modified versions of Situation Calculus and 
Event Calculus were shown to be equivalent. The main motivation for our research 
on this topic then was an unexpected problem arising during an attempt o provide 
a transformation from temporal domain descriptions in the d language ([11]) to 
(Open) Event Calculus theories. Where a transformation of ~ to (Open) Situation 
Calculus was established and proved sound and complete in [7], our proposed 
transformation to Event Calculus was incorrect. A detailed analysis pointed out 
that the problem could not be fixed by modifying the transformation, but was 
actually inherent to the Event Calculus, and in particular to its linear time 
structure. Evidently then, the question arose how this relates to the equivalence 
result in [14]. 
We first illustrate the problem. It concerns the representation f counterfactual 
statements of the form "If A had happened, then B would have held." Such 
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statements can be correctly represented in theories with a branching time struc- 
ture, where one can simultaneously talk about several possible evolutions of the 
world. Examples of such theories are ~'  and Situation Calculus. 
At first sight, counterfactuals can be handled equally well using a form of 
abductive reasoning in a linear time theory, but this intuition is apparently not 
correct. We clarify the point with an example. 
Assume we initially have a living turkey, and there is no information on the 
initial state of the gun. In this situation, a shoot event occurs. We also know that, if 
instead of shooting we had simply waited, the gun would have been loaded 
afterward. The question is then: can the turkey be alive after the shoot event? 
The intended answer is no: indeed, since we know that the gun would have been 
loaded if we had waited instead of shooting, we can conclude that it must have 
been loaded before the wait event (in the initial situation), since waiting can not 
have loaded the gun. Therefore, shooting in the initial situation must have killed 
the turkey. 
An open logic programming representation f this problem in Situation Calculus 
looks as follows. The initial situation is described by the predicate initially. This 
predicate is undefined here as we have no complete information on it. However, 
there is partial information represented by the FOL axiom 
initially(alive). 
We represent the knowledge about the counterfactual situation by a FOL axiom 
holds (loaded, result ( wait, s o ) ). 
This axiom, though expressed in terms of the holds predicate, actually constrains 
the possible values of the undefined initially predicate. Indeed, the open logic 
program without the FOL axiom has two models: one in which initially(loaded) is 
true and one in which it is false. In the latter model, we can derive 
holds(loaded, So), and therefore --1 holds(loaded, result(wait, So)). This is inconsis- 
tent with the FOL axiom, so this model of the program clauses is not a model of 
our theory. The only valid model is the one in which initially(loaded) is true. In that 
model, we find holds(loaded, So), from which we can obtain the intended result 
-1 holds (alive, result ( shoot, s o ) ). 
using the clauses for termination of fluents. 
In Event Calculus, the representation which springs to mind is the following: 
since we want to reason about different sequences of events, we assume incomplete 
knowledge on events and their order. We declare happens and act as well as < 
undefined. Representing knowledge about a counterfactual situation is done in a 
way very similar to that in Situation Calculus, by using an axiom of the form "if this 
sequence of events happens, then this formula will hold afterward." To simplify 
notation, we first define a new predicate intevents/2,  int events( T, T*) indicates 
that one or more intermediate events occur between T and T*. 
int_events(T, T*) ~-- happens( E', T'), ( T < T'), ( T' < T*). 
Like in Situation Calculus, we have an undefined initially predicate, and our 
knowledge on the initial situation is represented by the FOL axiom 
initially (alive). 
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Our knowledge about the counterfactual evolution of the world is represented by 
(happens(  eI , t I ) &act  ( ex , wait)  & --7 int_events(  t o , t 1) ) 
VT  : ( t 1 < T& --1 int_events(  tl, T )  ) =~ holds( loaded,  T )  
and we can express our query as 
(happens(  ez , t2) &act (  e z , shoot)  & ~ int_events(  t 0 , t2) ) 
VT:  (t 2 < T & -~ int_events(  t 2 , T ) ) ~ holds(al ive,  T ) ). 
Sadly enough, this is not a correct representation. Indeed, due to the linear time 
constraint in Event Calculus, the left-hand side of the axiom and the left-hand side 
of the query can never evaluate to true in the same interpretation. Either e 2 can 
follow start without intermediate vents, or e I can, but not both. Therefore, our 
axiom has no influence on any useful answers to our query (answers in which the 
query's lefthandside is true), where it should have provided us with extra informa- 
tion. In fact, we have not been able to model the counterfactual statement i f  we 
had waited, the gun would have been loaded, but have only (and insufficiently) 
approximated it modeling i f  we have waited, the gun was loaded afterward. 
This boils down to the following: for each sequence of events, our theory has at 
least one model in which that sequence occurs. However, within one model, only 
one sequence of events can exist. Combining information about two unrelated 
sequences of events is not possible within the formalism, because one sequence 
always excludes the other. 
It should be mentioned that using meta-reasoning on the formalism we should 
be able to reach the desired conclusions. This is due to the fact that meta-rea- 
soning allows one to consider different object-level models in one meta-level 
model. As a result, if we restrict time to a linear order we can still perform 
counterfactual reasoning by reasoning on the formalism, but we can not model 
counterfactual reasoning within the formalism. 
Using branching time like in Situation Calculus, on the other hand, we find all 
different sequences (branches) of events in one model. This allows us to combine 
information about these branches, and therefore to perform counterfactual reason- 
ing within the formalism. 
We conclude that for counterfactual reasoning on the sequence of occurring 
actions it is not sufficient that a model exists for each considered sequence: we 
need all different sequences in the same model if we want to reason on how they 
relate to each other within the formalism. One way to achieve this is a branching 
time structure like in Situation Calculus. The use of abductive reasoning on a 
theory like Event Calculus with one time line in each model is not an adequate 
alternative. 
The previous example shows that Situation Calculus can be used to model 
problems that Event Calculus can not handle. This is apparently in contradiction 
with the equivalence result in [14], which is surprising and requires an explanation. 
The reason for the paradoxical results lies in the modifications applied to 
Situation Calculus in [14] to prove the equivalence with Event Calculus. To the 
frame axiom of Situation Calculus, "happens(A, S)" atoms are added, resulting in 
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the axiom 
holds( P, result( A ,  S ) ) ~ happens( A ,  S ), initiates( A ,  S, P ) . 
holds( P, result( A ,  S ) ) ~ happens(A, S ), holds(P, s ) , ~ terminates(A, S, P ) . 
This addition seems of little consequence, but it has the important effect that the 
frame axiom is now only applicable to situations resulting from actual, asserted 
sequences of actions, like in Event Calculus. Moreover, the FOL axiom 
(happens( A 1 , S) &happens( A 2 , S ) ) ~ A 1 =A 2 
is added, indicating that only one sequence of actions can exist. This of course is 
similar to the linear time constraint in Event Calculus, and it leads to exactly the 
same problems for counterfactual reasoning described above. 
In short, the modified Situation Calculus is indeed equivalent o tile Event 
Calculus under the appropriate assumptions, but it is strictly less expressive than 
the original Situation Calculus. Our goal in this paper is to slightly extend the 
Event Calculus and then to establish an equivalence between the calculi without 
losing any functionality (and actually while gaining some). 
Another difference between our approach and the one in [14] lies in the relation 
between time points and situations. In [14] situations are assumed to correspond to 
one time point. We take a different approach, considering a situation to be a set of 
time points, more specifically a set of time points between two actions, like in [20]. 
This point of view fits in more naturally with the concept of instantaneous actions, 
which we have adopted earlier. 
4. A GENERALIZED CALCULUS 
We now present a new calculus which extends both Situation Calculus and Event 
Calculus. Basically, we start with Event Calculus and extend it with branching time. 
After that, we will define situations and relate the new calculus to Situation 
Calculus. 
4.1. The New Calculus 
In our new calculus, event(E, T) indicates the occurrence of event E at the 
hypothetical time point T. The distinction between event/2 and the happens/2 
predicate of Event Calculus is related to the branching time aspect we introduce 
here. holds(P, T) means P holds at T. initially, initiates, terminates, act, time and 
< have the same meaning as in Event Calculus. 
The frame axiom is identical to the Event Calculus axiom with happens/2 
renamed to event/2: 
holds( P ,T )  *--event( E1 ,T , ) ,T  1 < T, initiates( E1 ,P ) ,  
clipped( T~ , P, T ) . 
clipped(T~, P, T)  ~- event(E2,7"2) , T 1 < T2, T 2 < T, 
terminates( E 2 , P ) . 
The difference with Event Calculus lies in the time structure: instead of the linear 
time constraints of Event Calculus, we introduce weaker constraints ensuring a 
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branching time structure. 
((TI < T2)&(T2 < TI)) 
((T1 < T2) &(T  2 < 7"3)) ~ (T  a < T3) 
((T, < T3)&(T  2 < 7"3) ~ (T, < T2) V (T  2 < T,) V (T, -- T2) 
(T  1 < T2) ~ (time(T1)&time(T2)) 
Like in Event Calculus, events correspond to exactly one time point and time 
points to at most one event. We assume a type predicate for actions action~l, 
which is domain dependent. We impose that at least one action exists. Like in 
Event Calculus, we also exclude simultaneous actions. 
(event(E ,T)&event(E* ,T*) )  ~ ( (E  =E*)  ~ (T= T* ) )  
• 4 : action(A) 
act(E, A) = action(A) 
(act(E, A,) &act(E, A2) ) ~A,  =A 2. 
We introduce an initial event at to: 
time(to) 
event( start, to) 
event( E ,T)  ~ ((t o < T) v ( E =start)) 
and relate initially to initiates by including the following clause in the definition of 
initiates: 
initiates( start, P ) ~ initially(P). 
Finally, we often need a notion of presence or absence of intermediate vents 
between two events. We define the predicate intevents as follows: 
int_events(T, *) ~ event ( E', T'), ( T < T'), ( T' < T*). 
The meaning of our theory is given by the FOL theory obtained as follows: we 
take all clauses in this section, add to them definitions in the form of clauses for 
initially, initiates (partially given in terms of initially above), terminates, event, <, 
act and time (and any predicates occurring in these clauses), and complete the 
resulting program using Console Completion. Some of these predicates (any except 
initiates and terminates) may be declared undefined instead. All FOL axioms are 
added to the resulting theory. 
4.2. Application 
We illustrate how we can use the new formalism to represent the counterfactual 
reasoning problem we encountered earlier, and which we failed to model in Event 
Calculus. 
To summarize the example again: initially there is a living turkey and a gun 
which may or may not be loaded. Then, a shoot event occurs. We know that, if we 
had waited instead of shooting, the gun would have been loaded afterward. 
Question is if the turkey can be alive after the shooting (it should not). 
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As before, initially is undefined. One FOL axiom describes our knowledge on 
the initial state of the world: 
init ial ly(al ive). 
We assume incomplete knowledge on the existing time points (t ime is undefined). 
Evidently then < is undefined as well, and we express our knowledge on < by 
FOL constraints. We do, however, for the sake of simplicity, assume complete 
knowledge of all (real or counterfactual) relevant events and actions, so we can 
define these by enumeration. The following facts assert he existence of the events 
we want to reason on 
event ( e l , t l ) . ac t (e l , shoot  ) . 
event ( e2, t 2 ). act( e2, wait ) .  
These events occur in mutually exclusive evolutions of the world, so they are on 
two different branches in the time structure. The axioms 
t ime( t l )  t ime(t2)  
~(t l  <t2)  -~(t2 < tl) 
represent this knowledge. 
Observations about hypothetical evolutions of the world are in general repre- 
sented by FOL axioms. In this case we get the axiom 
VT:  ( ( t  2 < T)  & -7 int_events(  t 2 , T )  =~ holds( loaded,  T ) ) . 
As we can check, this axiom is only satisfied in models in which initially(loaded) is 
true. In those models, holds(loaded, t 1) is true, which implies terminates(e 1,alive). 
Therefore, 
VT : ((t  1 < T)  & -7 int_events(  t , , T )  =~ -7 holds(al ive,  T ) ) 
holds in all models of our theory, which is the intended result. 
This application shows that the above form of counterfactual reasoning is 
possible in the new formalism, where it is not in Event Calculus. The addition of 
branching time is responsible for the gain in expressivity. 
Note, by the way, that the modification of the time constraints to model a 
branching time structure instead of a line does not endanger the correctness of the 
formalism. The problems illustrated with the light switch example in Section 2 are 
avoided, because while time points are now allowed to be unrelated (in different 
branches), the constraints ensure that the branches do not merge again. In other 
words, even though not all time points are linearly ordered, for each time point all 
earlier time points are linearly ordered. 
4.3. In t roduc ing  S i tuat ions  
The open logic program in Section 4.1 forms the essence of our new calculus. Now 
we extend this theory with a number of additional concepts that correspond to the 
concepts in Situation Calculus. 
First of all, we introduce situations. We define a situation to be the set of all 
time points that are later than a certain event (the starting event of the situation), 
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and such that there are no other events between the starting event and the time 
point itself, We call the initial situation so, and use the term result(E, A, S) to 
denote the situation which is started by the event E with associated action A 
occurring in situation S. Note that A and S are uniquely determined by E, but not 
vice versa. For our discussion it is appropriate to include all three parameters in 
the situation name, as we do here. 
Informally, we get the following inductive definition: 
s o = {T[(t 0 < T) & ~ int_events(to,T)} 
result( E ,A ,S )  = {TI3T' :T' ~ S&euent( E ,T ' )&act(  E ,A)  
&(T'  < T) & ~ int_events(T', T)} 
which we express in the following clauses for the member predicate: 
member(T, So) ~ t o < T, -7 int_events( t o, T ) ). 
member( T, result ( E, A, S ) ) ~ event ( E, T') , member( T', S ) , 
act(E, A ), T' < T, -~ int_events( T', T ), 
where member(T, S) has the intended meaning T ~ S. 
We can then inductively define a type predicate for situations: so is a situation, 
and S = result(E, A, S') is a situation if S' is a situation, E an event occurring at a 
time point belonging to S' and A the action associated with that event. 
situation( s o ) . 
situation( result( E, A,  S') ) ~ situation(S'), action(A), 
member(T, S'), event(E, T), act( E, A).  
As before, the FOL theory corresponding to these definitions is obtained by taking 
their completion. 
Having introduced situations, we define what it means for a fluent to hold in a 
situation: we say that a fluent holds in a situation if and only if it holds at all time 
points belonging to that situation. We use the predicate holds_in/2 to express the 
truth value of fluents in a situation. 
holds_in(P, S) ~ V T : (member(T, S) ~ holds(P, T ) ) 
It is crucial to note here that to check if a fluent holds in a situation, it is not 
necessary to check all time points in the situation (which might well be impossible). 
Indeed, we can prove that a fluent holds at all time points in a situation if it holds 
at at least one. This is expressed in the following theorem: 
Theorem 4.1. 
VS : situation(S) ~ ([::IT: member(T, S) &holds(P, T)] 
[VT: member(T, S) ~ holds(P, T) ] ) .  
PROOF. Assume S is a situation. We know that 
3T : member(T, S) &holds(P, T) 
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and need to prove VT:member (T ,  S )~ holds(P, T). To this end, we first rewrite 
the above formula using the definit ion of holds: 
3 T , E '  , T ' : member (T ,  S)  & event ( E '  , T ' ) & T ' < T & initiates( E ' , P )  
& ~ cl ipped(T' ,  P,  T)  
where clipped(T', P, T)  is used (from now on) as a shorter notat ion for 
3E*,  T '  : event( E*,  T* ) & T '  < T* & T* < T &terminates( E*,  P ) . 
We distinguish two cases: a situation S is either s o or  has the form result(E, A ,  S')  
as descr ibed in the definition. First assume S = So: the above formula then reads 
[3T ,  E ' ,  T '  : (S = So&member(T ,  So) &event(  E ' ,  T ' )  &T '  < T& 
initiates( E ' ,  P )  & ~ clipped( T ' ,  P,  T) ) ] .  
We derive from member(T,  s o) that t o < T and ~ int_events(t o,T). Since T '  < T 
and t o < T hold, one of T '  < t 0, t o < T '  or  t o = T '  must be true. The first formula 
is inconsistent with the axiom that there are no events before t o , the second 
formula together  with T '  < T is inconsistent with --1 i n tevents ( t  o, T). Therefore 
t o = T' ,  and we can derive from the above disjunction that 
[3 T, E ' , T ' : ( S = s o & T ' = t o & E '  = start&t o < T & ~ int_events( to , T ) ) 
&event ( start, t o ) & initiates( start, P ) & -7 clipped( to , P,  T )  ] 
which implies 
S = s o &initiates(start, P ) .  
From this, it follows that P holds for each member  of s o. Indeed,  assume that 
member(T  +, So): we find for each such T + 
t o < T + & ~ int_ events ( to, T + ) & event ( start, t o ) & initiates ( start, P )  
so, because clipped(T, P, T ' )  implies int events( T, T'),  it follows that 
t o < T +& ~ clipped( to, P,  T + ) &event(  start, t o ) &initiates( start, P )  
and therefore holds(P, T+ ). 
Now take the second case: assume S = result(E*, A ,  S*) is a situation. F rom 
3 T , E ' , T ' : member (T ,  S) & event ( E ' , T ' ) & T ' < T & initiates( E ' , P )  
& ~ clipped( T ' ,  P,  T )  
we derive, using the definit ion of  situation and Clark's equal ity theory: 
3T,  E ' ,T ' ,E* ,T* ,A ,S* :  
( S = result( E*,  A ,  S*) &member (  T, result( E*,  A ,  S*))  
&situation(S*) &member(T* ,  S* ) &event(  E*,  T* ) &act(  E*, A )  
&event( E ' ,  T '  ) & T'  < T &initiates( E ' ,  P )  & -7 clipped( T ' ,  P,  T ) ) 
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which we rewrite using the definition of member to 
3T,  E ' ,T ' ,E* ,T* ,A ,S* :  
( S = result( E*, A,  S*) & T* < T& ~ int_events( T*, T) & 
situation(S*) &member(T*, S* ) &event(E*, T* ) &act(E*, A) & 
event ( E ' , T ' ) & T ' < T & initiates( E ' , P) & -7 clipped( T ' , P, T ) ). 
We now use the knowledge that T'  < T and T* < T. Given our FOL axioms on the 
time relation this implies that either T'  < T* or T'  = T* must hold (T* < T' can 
not hold because of ~ intevents(T*, T)): 
[3T, E ' ,T ' ,E* ,T* ,A ,S* :  
( S = result(E*, A,  S*) &T* < T&member(T*, S*) 
& --1 int_events(T*, T) &event( E*, T*) &act( E*, A)  & 
event ( E',  T' ) & T' < T* & initiates ( E', P) & ~ clipped( T', P, T) ) ] 
v 
[3T,  E*, T*, A, S* : 
( S = result( E*, A,  S*) & T* < T& ~ int_events( T*, T) & 
member(T*, S* ) &event(E*, T* ) &act(E*, A) & 
initiates( E*, P) & -~ clipped( r*, P, T) ) ] .  
Now, what we must prove is that for each member of S, P holds. So assume 
member( T +, S ). We add member(T +, S) to both disjuncts: 
[3T,  E ' ,  T ' ,  E ' ,  T*, A, S*: 
( S = result( E*, A,  S*) & T* < T&member( T*, S*) & ~ int_events( T*, T) & 
event(E*, T*) &act(E*, A) &event( E',  T') & T' < T* & 
initiates( E', P) & ~ clipped( T', P, T ) ) & member( T +, S ) ] 
v 
[3T, E* ,T* ,A ,S* :  
( S = result( E*, A, S*) & T* < T& ~ int_events( T*, T) & 
member(T*, S* ) &event(E*, T* ) &act(E*, A) & 
initiates(E*, P) & -1 clipped( T*, P, T ) ) & member( T + , S)] 
and rewrite them using the definition of member 
[3T, E ' ,T ' ,E* ,T* ,A ,S* ,T"  : 
( S = result(E*, A,  S*) &T* < T&member(T*, S*) 
&-~ int_events( T*, T) &event(E*, T* ) &act(E*, A) & 
event ( E' , T' ) & T' < T* & initiates( E' , P) & --7 clipped( T' , P, T) ) 
&event ( E*, T" ) & member( T" , S* ) & T" < T + & ~ int_ events ( T" , T + )] 
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V 
[3T, E* ,T* ,A ,S* ,T"  : 
( S = result( E*, A, S*) & T* < T& ~ int_events( T*, T) & 
member(T*, S*) &event(E*, T*) & 
act(E*, A) &initiates(E*, P) & ~ clipped(T*, P, T ) ) 
&event( E*, T" ) &member( T" , S* ) & T" < T + & -~ int_events( T" , T + )]. 
As events can only be associated with one time point, T" = T* must hold, so we 
can simplify the formula (also omitting some conjuncts) to 
[3 T, E ' ,  T ' ,  E*, T*: 
( event(E*, T*) &member( T*, S*) &act( E*, A) & 
T* < T +& ~ int_events( T*, T + ) & T* < T& -~ int_events( T*, T) & 
event( E', T' ) & T' < T* & initiates ( E', P) & -~ clipped( T', P, T ) ) ] 
V 
[3T, E*,T*: 
(event(E*, T*) &member(T*, S*) &act(E*, A) & 
T* < T +& -7 int_events(T*, T + ) &T* < T& 
int_events( T*, T) &initiates(E*, P) & ~ clipped(T*, P, T) ) ] .  
Now, in the first disjunct we can expand the definition of clipped~3: given T' < T*, 
T* < T and event(E*, T*), ~ clipped( T ', P, T) is equivalent to 
elipped( T' , P, T* ) & ~ terminates(E*, P) & -~ clipped(T*, P, T ) . 
The first two conjuncts of this formula together with ~ int_events(T*, P, T +) imply 
clipped( T ', P, T+). So from the disjunction above it follows that 
[3E' ,T ' ,E*,T*:  
( event ( E*, T*) & member( T*, S* ) & act ( E*, A ) & T* < T +& event ( E', T') & 
T' < T* &initates( E', P) & -~ clipped( T', P, T+))]  
V 
[3T, E' ,T ' :  
( event ( E', T') & member( T', S*) & act ( E', A) & 
T' < T + & ~ int_events( T', T + ) & T' < T&initiates( E', P) ) ]  
which leads, in both disjuncts, to the conclusion that 
holds( P, T + ) 
which proves the theorem for the case S = result(E*, A, S*). Together with the 
proof for S = s o above, this completes the proof of the theorem. [] 
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4.4. The Appl icat ion Revisited 
The introduction of situations in the new calculus allows us to simplify the 
representation of the application in Section 4.2 a little. We recall the clauses and 
axioms describing the scenario: 
initially(alive) 
event(el,  tx). 
event( ez , t 2). 
time( t a ) 
~(t l  <t2)  
act( el, shoot). 
act( e2, wait). 
time( tz) 
-~ (t e < tl) 
with undefined time, < and initially predicates. 
The observation 
g T : ( ( t 2 < T) & -7 int_events( t 2 , T) ~ holds(loaded, T ) ) 
can now be simplified to the equivalent formula 
holds_ in (loaded, result ( e2, wa it, s o ) ) 
and similarly the formula under consideration 
VT:  ( ( t 1 < T)  & --7 int_events( t l , T)  ~ -7 holds(alive, T ) ) 
can be simplified to 
holds_ in (alive, result ( el, shoot, s o ) ). 
This representation shows greater similarities with the one in Situation Calculus, 
and is definitely less cumbersome. 
5. RELATION TO THE ORIGINAL CALCULI 
As indicated before, the new calculus can be seen as an extension of both Situation 
Calculus and Event Calculus. We can obtain Situation Calculus or Event Calculus 
by adding specific constraints to the general calculus, as we prove in this section. 
Evidently, these specific constraints represent he essential difference between 
Situation Calculus and Event Calculus, and we will further study some of their 
implications later in the paper. 
First, we show that Event Calculus is a special case of the new calculus as 
described in Section 4.1. The only actual difference between the calcul i-- i f  we 
rename the event predicate to happens or vice versa, which is only a matter of 
syntax--is in the constraints on <.  
In Event Calculus, we have an axiom 
( t ime(T l )&t ime(T2))  =~ [ (T 1 < T2) V (T  2 < 7"1) V (T  1 = T2)], (1) 
where the corresponding axiom in the new calculus reads 
( (T  1 < T3)&(T  2 < T3) ) ~ [(T 1 < T2) V (T  2 < T1) v (T  1 = T2) ] . (2) 
As either calculus contains an axiom (T 1 < T 2) ~ (time(T1)&time(T2)), the left- 
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handside of (1) is implied by the lefthandside of (2), while their righthandsides are 
the same. Therefore, (2) is implied by (1): the Event Calculus axiom is strictly 
stronger than the new axiom. Intuitively, this corresponds to the fact that a time 
line is one special case of a branching time structure. 
So, to obtain Event Calculus, we only need to strengthen one axiom of our 
calculus, restricting the time tree to a line. 
We now show the relation of the new calculus to Situation Calculus. This is less 
straightforward than the relation to Event Calculus, partly because the frame 
axiom is formulated in a different way, but also because a number of assumptions 
in Situation Calculus are implicit in the data structure. These assumptions have to 
be made explicit in the new calculus, which will also result in a clearer view on 
them. 
First of all, we introduce the concepts described in Section 4.3, adding the 
clauses and axioms of that section to those in Section 4.1. 
A very important assumption inherent o Situation Calculus is the following. In 
Situation Calculus, each term result(A, S') where A is an action and S' is a 
situation, represents a new situation. All of these terms exist in the theory and 
therefore all of these situations are implicitly present in Situation Calculus. 
Moreover, for each action A and situation S', there is exactly one resulting 
situation result(A, S'). 
In other words, in Situation Calculus it is assumed that in each (hypothetical) 
situation each action occurs (in some hypothetical evolution of the world), and 
leads to exactly one new situation. Note that this is not necessarily true in our new 
calculus and requires an extra axiom. Since we have defined a situation as the set 
of time points after a certain event and before any other later events, in our new 
calculus this assumption reads that for each event E and action A, there is exactly 
one event E* consisting of the occurrence of A immediately after E 
VE, T, A : ( ( event( E, T) &action(A)) ~ 3E*, T*: 
[event(E*, T*) &(T < T*) &act(E*, A) & ~ int_events(T, *)] (ia) 
rE, T, E' ,T' ,  E*, T*, A : 
(( event(E, T) &action(A) &event( E', T') &act( E', A) & 
(ib). 
T < T'& --1 int_events( T, T') &event( E*, T*) &act( E*, A) & 
T < T* & int_events( T, T*) (E' = e*))  
This indeed implies that each action occurs in each situation in some possible 
evolution of the world, and leads to exactly one new situation: 
Lemma 5.1. 
(Lemma 5.1.a) 
VS, A : ( situation(S) &action(A)) 
3E, T: member( T, S) &event(E, T) &act( E, A) 
(Lemma 5.1.b) 
VS, A ,E ,T ,E ' ,T '  : 
( ( situation(S) &member( T, S) &event( E, T)) 
&act(E, A) &member(T', S) &event( E', T') &act( E', A) ) 
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PROOF. This lemma can be proved using axioms (ia) and (ib). We prove part a first: 
for all S and A, if situation(S)&action(A) then 
action(A) & 
((S = So) V [3E*, B, S*: (S = result(E*, B, S*) &situation(S*)) 
&action(B) & 3 T* : ( member( T*, S) & event( E*, T* ) & act( E*, B)) l ). 
With the fact event(start, t o) and axiom (ia) this implies 
[ S = So &event (start, to) & 
3E, T: (event(E, T) &t o < T&act( E, A) & ~ int_events(t o, T))] 
V 
[3E, T, E*, T*, B, S*: 
( S = result( E*, B, S*) &action(B) &situation(S*) 
&member( T*, S ) & event ( E*, T* ) & act ( E*, B) 
&event(E, T) & T* < T &act( E, A) & ~ int_events( T*, T))] 
which, using the definition of member, leads to 
3E, T : member(T, so) &S = so&event ( E, T) &act(E, A) 
V 
BE, T, B, S* : [member(T, result(E*, B, S* ) ) &event(E, T) &act(E, A) 
&S = result(E*, B, S*)] 
and therefore 
BE, T : member(T, S) &event( E, T) &act(E, A) 
which is what we needed to prove. 
The proof of part b is as follows: given S, A, E, T, E', T', assume 
( situation(S) & member ( T, S) & event( E, T) & act( E, A) 
&member ( T ', S) & event ( E', r '  ) & act ( E' , A) ) 
Again, we use the definition of situation to obtain 
IS =s  o v 3B, S*, E*, T*: 
( S = result(E*, B, S* ) &action(B) &situation(S*) 
&member(T*, S * ) &event(E*, r * ) &act(E*, n))]  
&member(T, S) &event( E, T) &act( E, A) 
&member( T', S) &event( E' , T' ) &act( E', A ) ) 
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which can be rewritten as 
[ S = s o &member( T, S) & event(E, T) &act( E, A) 
&member( T ' , S) & event( E ' , T ' ) & act ( E ' , A)] 
v 
laB,  S*, E*, r * :  ( S = result( E*, B, S*) &action(B) &situation(S*) 
&member(T*, S* ) &event(E*, T* ) &act(E*, B ) ) 
&member( T, S) &event( E, T) &act( E, A) 
&member( T', S) &event( E', T') &act( E', A)) ]  
and using the definition of member we get 
[ S = So&t o < T& ~ h~t_events( to, T) &event(E, T) &act(E, A) &t o < T' 
& -7 int_ events ( t o , T') & event ( E', T') & act ( E', A) & event ( start, to ) ] 
V 
[3B, S*, E*, T* :( S = result( E*, B, S*) &action(B) &situation(S*) 
&member(T*, S* ) &event(E*, T* ) &act(E*, B ) ) 
& T* < T & -1 int_events( T*, T) &event(E, T) &act(E, A) 
&T* < T' & ~ int_events( r*, V') &event( E', T') &act( E', A)) ] .  
Applying axiom (ib) to either part of the disjunction, we find 
E =E '  
which proves the lemma. [] 
This lemma also implies that to each (action, situation) pair there corresponds 
exactly one event consisting of that action occurring in that situation. A situation is 
then completely determined by the previous situation and the last action. There- 
fore, we can eliminate the event parameter in situation names and reduce the term 
result(E, A, S) to result(A, S). Our names for situations then coincide with those of 
Situation Calculus. 
Like in Situation Calculus, we want to state that the situation, reachable from 
the initial situation by executing a finite number of actions are the only situations 
that exist. This is expressed by the induction axiom 
V* :  [(VS: (situation(S) = * (S ) ) )  = 
(qb(s0) &VA, S: [ (~(S)  &action(A) &situation(S)) = 
¢(  result( A, S))]  )] 
One more thing we have to do before we can actually prove an equivalence of 
the frame axioms of Situation Calculus and the new calculus, is defining the 
concepts corresponding to the Situation Calculus predicates initiates/3 and termi- 
nates/3 in the new calculus. These predicates indicate when an action executed in 
a certain situation initiates or terminates a fluent. In terms of events the definitions 
read as follows (choosing new names in i t_s /3  and term s /3  to avoid confusion 
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with initiates/2 and terminates/2 for events): 
VA, S, P : (init_s( A, S, P) ,~, 3E, T: 
(member(T, S) &event(E, T) &act(E, A) &initiates(E, P ) ) ) 
VA,S,P:(term_s( A ,S ,P )  ¢* 3E, T: 
(member(T, S) &event(E, T) &act(E, A) &terminates(E, P )) ) 
With all the necessary concepts defined, we can now state our equivalence 
result. Intuitively, this result states that the predicate holds_in, defining the truth 
value of a fluent in a situation, coincides with the predicate holds' defined in terms 
of init_s and term_s by the Situation Calculus frame axiom as follows: 
holds'( P, So) ~ initially(P). 
holds'( P, result( A, S) ) ~ init_s( A, S, P). 
holds'( P, result( A, S) ) ~ holds'( P, S), ~ term_s( A, S, P). 
More formally, our result is the following: assume T is the open logic program 
consisting of the clauses and FOL axioms of this section and Sections 4.1 and 4.3, 
with undefined initiates, terminates, time, event, action, act and < predicates. Then 
Theorem 5.1. 
T ~ VP, S:situation(S) ~ (holds_in( P, S) ,~ holds'( P, S)) 
To prove this theorem, we first prove a lemma which extends theorem 4.1: 
Lemma 5.2. 
V S : situation(S) 
([3 T:  member(T, S) &holds( P, T)] ~ [VT: member(T, S) =* holds( P, T)] ) 
PROOF. The "~ part" is theorem 4.1. The proof of the "~ part" is straightfor- 
ward: all that needs to be proved for all S is 3T :  member(T,S), which follows 
immediately from lemma 5.1,a and the axiom that at least one action exists. [] 
We now proceed with the proof of theorem 5.1. 
PROOF. The proof of our theorem is by induction on situations. Using the induc- 
tion axiom on situations we find that the theorem follows from the formulae 
VP : holds'( P, So) ¢* holds_in(P, So) 
VP, A, S: (situation(S) &action(A)) = [ ( holds' ( P, S) ,~, holds_in(P, S ) ) 
(holds'( P, result( A, S ) ) ¢~ holds_in( P, result( A, S))]  
which we prove here. 
The first formula (the base case) can be proved as follows: using the definition of 
holds in, we write holds in(P, s o ) as 
VT:  [(t o < T & ~ int_euents( to, T ) ) = holds( P, T ) ] 
RELAT ION BETWEEN S ITUATION AND EVENT CALCULUS 25 
and using the definition of holds this is equivalent to 
VT:  [(t o < T&-~int_events(to,T)) =~ 3E ' ,T ' :  
( event ( E',  T') & T' < T& initiates( E',  P) & ~ clipped( T', P, T))  ] 
Because of the precondition t o < T& -1 intevents(to, T) and the axiom that t o is 
the first time point, we know that T' = t o. The above formula then reads 
VT : [(t 0 < T& ~int_events(to,T)) 
(event(start, t o) & t o < T & initiates( start, P) & -1 clipped( to , P, T ) ) ] 
Provided that 3T: (t o < T&--1 int_events(to, T)), which follows immediately from 
axiom (ia), this formula implies initiates(start, P). On the other hand, 
initiates(start, P) implies the above formula, as ~ clipped(t o, P, T) trivially follows 
from -7 int_events( to, T ). 
So we find that holds_in(P, s o) ¢~ initiates(start, P). Of course, we also know 
that initiates(start, P) is equivalent o initially(P) and therefore to holds'(P, so). 
This completes the proof of the base case. 
The proof of the induction step is rather tedious. We state the result here as a 
new lemma: 
Lemma 5.3. 
T ~ VP, A,  S : [situation(S) &action( A)] 
:~ [ ( holds' ( P, S) ~ holds_in(P, S ) ) 
(holds'( P, result( A,  S ) ) ~ holds_in( P, result( A,  S)) ] .  
We refer the reader to the appendix for the details of the proof of this lemma. 
Given the base case proved above and lemma 5.3, our theorem now follows 
directly from the induction axiom. This completes the proof that the predicate 
holds'/2 defined by the Situation Calculus frame axiom coincides with holds_in~2 
defined in terms of the holds predicate for time points in our new calculus. [] 
6. RESTRICTIONS OF SITUATION CALCULUS 
FOR COUNTERFACTUAL REASONING 
As we argued in Section 5, the key reason for the success of Situation 
Calculus--compared to Event Calculus--at counterfactual reasoning was that in 
each model of a Situation Calculus theory, all relevant real and counterfactual 
situations were present. On the logical level, the existence of the necessary 
situations in Situation Calculus is ensured by: 
1. The use of the functor result~2 to encode situations, combined with the fact 
that in classical ogic a functor represents a total mapping, as stated explicitly 
by the tautology VA,Sl :3S2:result(A,  S 1) = S 2. Our definition of the type 
predicate situation~1 ensures that S 2 is a situation if A is an action and S 1 a 
situation. 
2. The presence of Clark's equality theory, which entails that different situation 
terms represent different situations. 
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In this section, we further illuminate this key point for counterfactual reasoning. 
We do this by introducing a class of temporal domains and showing that represen- 
tations of these domains in Situation Calculus do not allow to derive intended 
conclusions based on counterfactual information. The reason for this will be shown 
to be that for these domains, also in Situation Calculus, not all relevant counterfac- 
tual situations are present in each model. 
The class of temporal domains under scrutiny makes use of nondeterministic 
actions: actions which, when executed in one and the same situation, may have 
different effects and hence can lead to different resulting states. 
There are several different ways in which nondeterministic a tions can arise in a 
temporal domain. The modeled action may be truly nondeterministic like the 
radioactive decay of particles, or it may be deterministic but dependent on very 
small differences in the world or in the way the action is performed, differences 
which are not modeled in the theory. In some cases, for example when represent- 
ing the action of rolling a die, these differences can not be reasonably modeled. In 
other cases the domain may be modeled at a high level of abstraction, on which the 
differences that influence the action are not visible. In the latter case the nondeter- 
minism can be eliminated by using a lower, more detailed, level of abstraction. 
We start with an example illustrating the representation of nondeterministic 
actions in Situation Calculus. 
Assume a variant of the Yale shooting problem where the shoot action has a 
nondeterministic effect: sometimes the bullet only wounds the turkey and does not 
kill it (for example because the hunter has waited a split second longer, the gun has 
been aimed a little differently, the turkey has moved slightly or for some other 
reason we do not know). If we perform shoot in a situation in which both alive and 
loaded hold, two resulting situations are possible: one in which alive holds (and 
wounded as well), and one in which it does not. 
The effect of shooting could in this case be modeled by the formula 
initiates( A, S, wounded) v terminates( A, S, alive) 
A = shoot & holds ( loaded, S) & holds (alive, S) 
plus some formulae "completing" the above one (the disjunction in the head, which 
represents the nondeterminism, disallows standard predicate completion): 
initiates( A, S, wounded) ~ A = shoot & holds( loaded, S) 
&holds( alive, S) 
& -~ terminates( A, S, alive) 
terminates( A, S, alive) ~ A = shoot & holds ( loaded, S) 
&holds( alive, S) 
& ~ initiates( A, S, wounded). 
A representation which fits better into our formalism and which allows for the use 
of standard completion, can be obtained from the above one by introducing an 
undefined "degree of freedom" predicate. The use of degree of freedom predicates 
for representing nondeterminism was originally proposed in [8] in the context of 
Event Calculus. In general specifications of the above type using disjunctions can 
be transformed rather easily into OLP specifications with degree of freedom 
predicates. 
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We illustrate the method by modeling the above problem domain in OLP. The 
rules for initiation and termination read: 
initiates( A,  S, loaded) ~ A = load. 
terminates( A,  S, loaded) ,-- A = shoot. 
terminates( A,  S, alive) *--A = shoot, holds( loaded, S ) , 
holds( alive, S ) , luck( A,  S ) . 
initiates( A ,  S, wounded) *-- A = shoot, holds( loaded, S ), 
holds( alive, S),  -~ tuck( A ,  S ) . 
where luck~2 is an undefined predicate indicating whether or not the hunter is 
lucky during a particular instance--determined here by the situation in which it 
occurs- -of  the shoot action (i.e. whether his shot kills the turkey or not). 
The actual outcome of the nondeterministic a tion (i,e., the choice of disjunct in 
the original effect axiom) depends on this undefined predicate, on which we have 
no information. The theory does not entail or exclude either outcome. 
Note that the truth value of the undefined predicate is not dependent on the 
state of the world at the action's time of occurrence: the predicate should be 
considered to represent an unknown modifier of the nondeterministic a tion. It is 
not a fluent. This is slightly more apparent in the Event Calculus/new calculus 
representation: 
initiates( E, loaded) c--- 
terminates( E, loaded) c--- 
terminates(E, alive) ,-- 
initiates(E, wounded) 
act(E, load). 
act( E, shoot). 
act(E, shoot), event( E, T ) , holds(loaded, T ) , 
holds( alive, T ), luck(E) .  
act( E, shoot), event( E, T ) , holds(loaded, T ), 
holds(alive, T),  -, luck(E) ,  
where luck/1 is an undefined predicate parameterized with the event it refers to. 
In the Situation Calculus representation the (action, situation) pair is the equiva- 
lent of this event. 
The following scenario illustrates ome forms of reasoning with nondeterminis- 
tic actions in Situation Calculus. Given a turkey which is initially alive and a gun 
which is initially loaded, as represented by 
initially(alive). 
initially (loaded). 
We want to determine whether the turkey is alive or not after shooting, so if 
holds(alive, result(shoot, so)) or its negation are entailed. The only undefined predi- 
cate is luck/2, as explained above. 
Because luck/2 is undefined, the theory has models in which luck(shoot, so) is 
true as well as models in which it is false. In the former set of models, the formula 
holds(alive, result(shoot, So)) is false, in the latter it is true. Therefore, as intended, 
neither this formula nor its negation are entailed. 
Independent observations may give additional information on a certain scenario. 
If in the scenario above we had observed that the turkey was dead after we had 
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reloaded the gun, i.e., if ~ holds(alive, result(load, result(shoot, So))) was an addi- 
tional FOL axiom, the new theory would entail luck(shoot, so) and therefore 
holds(alive, result(shoot, So)). 
This briefly illustrates that Situation Calculus is capable of certain forms of 
reasoning with nondeterministic a tions. 
However, problems arise when on these nondeterministic a tions counterfactual 
reasoning is performed. The reason for this is that Situation Calculus can not in 
general represent all relevant situations resulting from a nondeterministic a tion. 
The following scenario illustrates this: we shoot a turkey, which is initially alive, 
with a gun that may or may not be loaded. We have the additional information that 
the outcome of shooting could have been that the turkey died. Note that no matter 
whether the gun was loaded or not, the turkey could still be alive after shooting, 
due to the nondeterminism involved in that action. The information that the turkey 
could be dead as well entails that the gun was initially loaded. 
We can represent he scenario in Situation Calculus as follows. The initially 
predicate is undefined, and one FOL axiom about it is given: 
initially(alive). 
The luck predicate is undefined as well. The information about the counterfactual 
outcome of shooting is represented by the axiom 
-7 holds (alive, result ( shoot, s o ) ) 
which entails initially(loaded), as intended. However, it also trivially entails the 
falsity of 
holds (alive, result ( shoot, s o ) ). 
So in Situation Calculus, we reach the unintended conclusion that the turkey would 
always be dead after shooting. 
In a theory correctly representing the above scenario, it is required that more 
than one situation resulting from a shoot action in the initial situation is present in 
one model. This problem can not be solved in Situation Calculus, although it can 
arguably be sidestepped by replacing the shoot action type by two different 
(deterministic) action types, for example shoot_and_kill and shoot_and_wound. 
The nondeterminism is then eliminated, which evidently avoids the problem 
sketched above. 
As opposed to Situation Calculus, the new calculus allows for a direct represen- 
tation of nondeterministic a tions and for counterfactual reasoning on them. This 
is due to the fact that the new calculus allows multiple situations to result from the 
same sequence of actions in the same model. If we can enforce the existence of 
these different situations, counterfactual reasoning is no longer a problem. 
The existence of all possible situations can be guaranteed by FOL axioms. If 
only deterministic actions are present, axiom (ia) of Section 5 or Lemma 5.1.a 
which is derived from it, are sufficient. In terms of situations, the axiom can also be 
written as 
V S, A : ( situation(S) & action (A) )  ~ 3E : situation( result ( E, A,  S) ). 
When nondeterministic actions are present, this axiom must be extended with 
specific axioms ensuring that for each nondeterministic a tion the situation tree 
contains situations corresponding to all possible outcomes of that action. 
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As an example, we take the Yale shooting domain with nondeterministic shoot 
action we modeled above. The existence of all possible situations resulting from 
shooting can be ensured by the following axiom (note that nondeterminism only 
occurs when both alive and loaded hold in a situation) 
VS:(  situation(S) &holds_in(loaded, S) &holds_in(alive, S) ) 
[ 3 E : ( situation ( result ( E, shoot, S) & luck (E)  ) 
& 3E' :  ( situation ( result ( E' ,  shoot, S) & --1 luck (E ' )  ) ]. 
Similar axioms can be added to any domain description for each nondeterministic 
action it contains. 
As an example of counterfactual reasoning on this domain, we represent he 
above scenario in the new calculus. Undefined predicates are initially and luck as 
well as event, act and <.  There is a FOL axiom on initially: 
initially(alive). 
The information on the counterfactual shoot event can be represented by the 
axioms 
situation (result ( e I , shoot, So ) ) 
-7 holds_in(alive, result( e a , shoot, s o ) ). 
We have to check if the turkey can survive a shot under the given conditions, i.e., if 
3E : situation (result(E, shoot, s o) ) &holds_in(alive, result(E, shoot, s o )). 
The axioms ~ holds_in(alive, result( e 1, shoot, So)) and initially(alive) then entail 
initially(loaded). This in turn entails, combined with initially(alive) and the exis- 
tence of situations axiom for the shoot action, that 
3E : situation(result(E, shoot, s o ) ) & -7 luck(E).  
The initiation and termination rules on the other hand guarantee that for each E 
situation(result( E, shoot, s o ) ) & -1 luck(E) =* 
holds_in (alive, result ( E, shoot, s o ) ) & holds_ in (wounded, result ( E, shoot, So) ) 
is true. Combining these formulae we conclude that the turkey can be alive after 
shooting. Moreover, the theory also entails that if the turkey survives the shot, it 
will certainly be wounded. 
This example shows how the deficiency of Situation Calculus for counterfactual 
reasoning can be dealt with in a more general calculus, in which the time tree 
contains more situations. 
7. DISCUSSION 
In this paper we have presented a new calculus extending Situation Calculus and 
Event Calculus. We have used the new calculus as an analysis tool for comparing 
the original calculi. 
Our approach differs in several respects from the comparison made in [14]. First 
of all, in [14] the similarities of the calculi were highlighted by reducing them to a 
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common core. Here we complement this work, by creating a calculus which extends 
rather than restricts both original calculi and by explicitly representing the restric- 
tions needed to obtain either of them from the general calculus. We study the 
implications of these restrictions, indicating in what aspects the original calculi 
differ and for which types of reasoning they fall short. 
Another difference between our comparison and the one in [14] is the way in 
which time points are related to situations. In [14], there is a one-to-one correspon- 
dence between Situation Calculus situations and Event Calculus time points. A 
situation is seen as a snapshot of the world at one instant in time. However, we 
favour the view in for example [20], where situations correspond to extended 
periods of time. Hence our definition of situations as sets of time points. 
Our approach also differs from Pinto and Reiter's: in [20] a time line (a path of 
actual event occurrences) is added to Situation Calculus, running only through one 
"actual" sequence of situations. In our proposal we treat all situations as equal, 
creating a tree of (hypothetical) events and time points running through all of the 
situations instead of only through one sequence of them. The extra expressivity 
obtained by this embedding of a time line in situations (which, for example, is 
necessary for modeling continuously changing quantities) is thereby extended to all 
hypothetical situations instead of to only the actual ones. z
As we indicated in the Introduction, one of the motivations for this research was 
our failure to find a sound and complete translation of .a¢ descriptions into Event 
Calculus. The advantage of such a translation of high-level action languages like ~¢ 
into temporal reasoning formalisms, is that a more general evaluation of these 
formalisms is obtained than by only presenting a number of standard examples and 
handling them in the formalism. 
Since the introduction of ~,  translations of that language into many formalisms 
have been described, for example in [12] (where the classical ogic formalisations of 
Situation Calculus in [19] and [21], as well as Baker's circumscriptive approach 
described in [2], are presented as translations from ~¢), [7] (where a translation into 
Open Logic Programming Situation Calculus is given) and [28] which translates .~' 
into equational ogic programming. Soundness and completeness theorems for 
these translations are given. 
As can be expected given the results described in this paper and in [7], a 
mapping of ~¢ descriptions into the new calculus is indeed possible. 
Informally, this follows from the following observations: a mapping of ~¢ into 
Open Logic Programming Situation Calculus is provided in [7]. The Situation 
Calculus used there differs in one small respect from ours: a predicate noninertial/3 
is used instead of initiates~3 and terminates~3. However, it is not hard to modify 
the mapping to deal with this difference. 
A second slight complication is that we need to integrate the mapping of 
Situation Calculus into the new calculus with the mapping of ~' into Situation 
Calculus. However, also this problem can be dealt with rather easily. We do not go 
into the details in this paper. 
2Related to this, it is worth mentioning that our situations do not correspond totime periods in a 
strict sense, due to the fact that we are working with a branching time theory: the sets of time points 
specified by our definition of situations are not short straight lines, but rather small trees with one event 
for a root (this root event is not part of the situation) and with each branch either ending in an event or 
running on forever. 
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Another issue related to this discussion on ~¢ is the following: in [13] an 
extension of ~¢, called .a¢~' 0, is introduced. This language allows to describe actions 
with indirect effects and simple forms of nondeterminism. A translation of this 
language into a variant of Situation Calculus is given. The question arises how this 
relates to our observation that nondeterminism leads to problems in Situation 
Calculus. 
Without going into the details, we observe that nondeterminism can be repre- 
sented in ~¢~9£ 0, like in Open Logic Programming Situation or Event Calculus, but 
that the forms of counterfactual reasoning described above can no longer be 
represented in the presence of this nondeterminism. The reason for this is the 
same as in Situation Calculus: it is impossible to distinguish between two sequences 
consisting of exactly the same actions in one model. We do not pursue the point 
further here. 
Regarding the new calculus, some other issues are of interest. For example, in 
certain cases (natural anguage processing springs to mind) it may be important o 
distinguish actual from hypothetical or counterfactual events. In our formalism 
there is no distinction between them. However, it is not hard to add such 
distinction. We can select one line of time points to be the actual line, for example 
using the predicate actual~1 to indicate actual time points. This predicate would 
have to satisfy the following FOL axioms for all T~ and 7"2: 
actual( T 1 ) ~ time( T 1 ) 
(actual (T1)&actual (T2))  ~ [ (T  1 < T2) V (T  2 < T1) V (T~ = T2) ] 
actual(to) 
indicating that all actual time points are time points, that they form a line, and that 
the initial time point is actual. 3
In [23] the issue of narratives is addressed. A narrative is a course of real events 
about which there might be incomplete information. 4 Narratives are typically what 
Event Calculus-like theories reason on. In [23] such courses of real events are 
introduced in Situation Calculus. There is some relation to the work of [20], though 
the approach is different. The issue of incomplete knowledge on the course of 
events is addressed explicitly, as well as the issue of simultaneous or overlapping 
actions (which have a non-zero duration). On the other hand, like in [20] the issue 
of counterfactual reasoning is not addressed. We feel the paper is complementary 
tO ours .  
The modeling of continuous change in Event Calculus has been studied in [27] 
for the quantitative case and in [29] for the qualitative case. The approach of 
Shanahan relies on calculations with real numbers, which makes it unsuited for 
extension to branching time structures. The approach in [29], however, does not 
use any calculations on time points and therefore leaves the possibility of branch- 
ing time open. This means hypothetical reasoning on continuously changing 
quantities becomes possible. This has not been studied in detail yet, and we do not 
pursue the point further here. 
3Obviously, the actual time line corresponds exactly to the time structure of Event Calculus. Event 
Calculus can indeed be seen as a restriction of the new calculus to only real time points. 
4In our Event Calculus this would be represented by an undefined happens predicate partially 
defined by FOL axioms. 
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Throughout the paper we have stressed the importance of the existence of all 
relevant situations in each model for counterfactual reasoning. In particular, 
counterfactual reasoning on nondeterministic a tions is possible when multiple 
situations resulting from the same action are present in a situation tree. One 
related issue we have not explicitly addressed is counterfactual reasoning on the 
initial state of the world, i.e. the representation f statements like "If  the gun had 
not been loaded initially, the turkey would have been alive after shooting." A 
correct representation of such statements requires that models contain multiple 
"possible" initial situations. 
This can be achieved in a way very similar to the one we used when dealing with 
nondeterministic actions: an extra parameter can be included in the initially 
predicate; this parameter distinguishes between several possible initial situations, 
just like the extra event parameter in situation names distinguishes between 
different resulting situations from an action. For example, initially(aliue, s 2) would 
represent that alive holds in one of the initial situations, s2. Each initial situation 
then functions as the root of one tree of situations. Counterfactual reasoning can 
be performed by combining information on different possible initial situations. 
Actually, we could adopt a different representation of the initial situation--as 
proposed in [14J--assuming the initial situation is the result of a creation action 
which itself occurs in a (pre-initial) situation in which no fluents hold. Then the 
above solution can be merged with the nondeterministic a tion solution by making 
creation nondeterministic. This will yield the multiple required "initial" situations 
for counterfactual reasoning as different possible outcomes of the creation action. 
APPENDIX: PROOF OF LEMMA 5.3 
Lemma 5.3. 
V P, A,  S: [situation(S) &action( A)] ~ [( holds'( P, S) ¢~ holds_in( P, S ) ) 
(holds'( P, result(A, S ) ) ,~ holds_in( P, result( A, S))].  
PROOf. We need to prove for all A, P and S that, given situation(S) and 
action(A), and given holds'( P, S) *~ holds in(P, S), it follows that 
holds'( P, result( A,  S ) ) ¢~ holds_in ( P, result( A,  S ) ) . 
To this end, we rewrite holds'(P, result(A, S)) and holds_in(P, result(A, S)) first. 
holds'(P, result(A, S)) is by definition equivalent to 
[holds'( P, S) & -1 term_s ( A,  S, P)] V init_s ( A,  S, P) 
which is the same as (using the induction hypothesis) 
[holds_in(P, S) & -~ term_s( A,  S, P)] v init_s( A,  S, P) 
and using the definitions of holds_in, term_s and i n i t s ,  this is equivalent to 
['¢ T ' :  ( member( r '  , S ) ~ holds'( P, T' ) ) & -7 3E* , r* : 
(member(T*, S) &event( E * , T * ) &act( E * , A)  &terminates( E * , n)) ]  
V 
3 E +, T + : (member( T + , S) & euent(E +, r + ) &act(E +, A) & 
initiates( E +, P ) ) ] . 
We will call this formula ~. 
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On the other hand, holds_in(P, result(A, S)) is equivalent o 
VT : member( T, result(A, S)  ) ~ holds(P, T) .  
This formula will be called ft. 
We need to prove that ~-,=, ~'. First we prove that ~r~ ft. Assume 3- is given. 
We can write member(T, result(A, S)) as 
3E ' , T ' : ( event ( E'  , T ' ) & T ' < Z & act ( E ' , A )  & member( T ' , S) 
& ~ int_eeents( T' ,  T ) ) .  
If we add this formula to both disjuncts of ~gr we can derive 
[3E ' ,  T' : ( event( E ' ,  T ' )  & T' < T&act(  E' ,  A)  &member( T' ,  S) & 
int_events( T' , T)  &holds( P, T' ) & -~ terminates( E'  , P) ) ]  
v 
[3E ' ,T ' ,E" ,T"  : (event (E ' ,T ' )&T '  < T&act (E ' ,A )& 
member( T' ,  S) & -1 int_events( T' ,  T ) ) & 
event( E" , T" ) & member ( T" , S) & act ( E" , A )  & initiates( E" , P)  ) ]. 
Applying lemma 5.1.b to the second disjunct, this turns into 
[3E',  T' :(event( E' ,  T ' )  &T '  < T&act( E' ,  A)  &member(T ' ,  S) & 
int_events( T' ,  T)  &holds(P, T ' )  & -7 terminates( E' ,  P) ) ]  
V 
[ 3E ' , T ' , E" , T" : (event (E ' ,  T ' ) & T ' < T & act( E ' , A )  & member( T ' , S) & 
int_events( T',  T)  ) &initiates( E' ,  P) ) ] .  
Then we use the definitions of holds, and derive -7 cl ipped(T' ,P,T) from the 
stronger -7 in tevents(T ' ,  T) in both disjuncts: 
[ 3E' ,  T' ,  E" , T" : (euent (E ' ,  T ') & T' < T&act( E' ,  A ) & member( T' ,  S) & 
-~ clipped( T ' ,  P, T)  & -~terminates( E' ,P) &event( E' , T" ) & 
T" < T' &initiates( E",  P)  & -~ clipped( T", P, T ' )  )] 
V 
[3E ' ,T ' ,  E",  T" : ( event( E ' ,T ' )  &T '  < T&act( E' ,  A)  & 
clipped( T' ,  P, T)  ) &initiates( E' ,  P) ) I .  
Now, from 
-~ clipped( T ' , P, T )  &event( E ' , T ' ) & ~ terminates( E ' , P)  & 
-1 clipped( T" , P, T' ) 
and the time relations, we can derive -~ clipped(T", P, T), which leads to the 
conclusion that in both disjuncts we can apply the definition of holds to get 
holds( P, T)  
which proves ft. 
34 K. VAN BELLEGHEM ET AL. 
Now the only thing left for us to prove is that ~ ~ ~. This can be proved as 
follows: ~" is, because of lemma 5.2, equivalent to 
3 T : member ( T, result ( A,  S))  & holds ( P, T) 
or, using the definitions again 
3T,  E' ,  T',  E", T" : ( T" < T&event( E", T") &initiates( E", P)  & 
clipped( T" , P, T)  & T' < T &event( E',  T')  & 
act ( E',  A)  & member ( T',  S) & -7 int_events ( T' ,  T)  ). 
Here we see T" < T and T' < T, which implies either T" < T' or T" = T'(T '  < T" 
is impossible because of -~ int_ecents(T', T)). So we find 
[ 3 T , E ' , T ' , E" , T" : (T"  < T ' & event ( E" , T" ) & initiates( E" , P ) & 
-~ clipped( T", P, T)  & T' < T&event( E' ,  T')  & 
act ( E ' , A)  & member ( T ' , S) & ~ int_events ( T ' , T))]  
V 
[ 3 T, E' ,  T' : ( event ( E' ,  T') &initiates( E',  P)  & -~ clipped(T', P, T)  & 
T' < T &act( E' ,  A)  &member( T',  S) & ~ int_events( T',  T) ) ] .  
From the first disjunct, we can derive on one hand 
3T,  E ' ,T ' ,E" ,T"  : (T"  < T'&event( E",T")&initiates( E" ,P )&  
T' < T&member( T',  S) & -~ :IE*, T* : 
[ event( E*, T* ) & T" < T* & T* < T &terminates( E*, P ) ] ) 
and on the other hand 
:IT, E ' ,T ' ,E" ,T"  :(T" < T'&event( E ' ,T ' )&act (  E ' ,A )& 
T' < T&member(T' ,  S) & ~ 3E*, T* : 
[ event( E*, T*) & T" < T* & T* < T& terminates( E*, P)] ) 
and we can simplify the second disjunct. In this way, we find the disjunction above 
implies the formula 
[:IT, E', T',  E" , T" : ( T" < T' &event(E", T" ) &initiates(E", P) & 
T' < T&member(T' ,  S) & ~ 3E*, T* : 
[ event( E*, T* ) & T" < T* & T* < T &terminates( E*, P ) ] ) 
& 
3T,  E ' ,T ' ,E" ,T"  : (T" < T '&event (E ' ,T ' )&act (E ' ,A )& 
T' < T&member(T' ,  S) & -~ 3E*, T* : 
[ event( E*, T*) & T" < T* & T* < T&terminates( E*, P)]  )] 
V 
:i T, E ' , T ' : ( event( E ' , T ' ) &initiates( E ' , P) &act( E ' , A )  &member( T ' , S ) ) 
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which in its turn implies 
[3T ' ,E" ,T"  : (T"  < T' &event( E",T")&init iates( E" ,P )  
&member( T' ,  S) & ~ 3E*, T* : 
[ ecent( E*, T* ) & T" < T* & T* < T' &terminates( E*, P ) ] ) 
& 
3E' ,  T' : ( event( E' ,  T')  &act( E' ,  ,4) &member( T' ,  S) & -7 terminates( E' ,  P) ) ]  
V 
[ 3E ' , T ' : ( event ( E'  , T ' ) & initiates( E' , P) & act ( E'  , ,4) & member( T ' , S) ) ] .  
Using the definition of holds and lemma 5.1.b on the first disjunct, we find 
[3T ' :  ( member( T' , S) &holds(P, T' ) ) 
& 
rE ' ,  T' : ( ( event ( E' ,  T' ) &act ( E' ,  A)  &member( T',  S ) ) 
-7 terminates( E' ,  P) ) ] 
V 
[3E ' ,  T ' :  ( event( E' ,  T')  &initiates( E' ,  P) &act( E' ,  A)  &member( T',  S) ) ] .  
Finally, we use lemma 5.2 and some rewriting on the first disjunct to obtain 
[VT ' :  ( member( T' , S) ~ holds(P, T' ) ) 
& 
3E'  , T ' : ( event ( E ' , T' ) & act ( E' , A)  & member( T' , S) & terminates( E' , P) ) ]  
v 
[3E ' ,  T ' :  ( event( E' ,  T')  &initiates( E' ,  P) &act( E' ,  A)  &member( T' ,  S))]  
which is equivalent o ~.  
This then completes the proof that in our theory T, for all A, P and S, 
situation (S)  & action ( A ) & ( holds '( P, S) ~ holds_ in ( P, S) ) 
implies 
holds'( P, result(,4, S ) ) ~ holds_in(P, result(A, S ) ) . 
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